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Extra-Judicial Decision Making for Drug Safety
and Risk Management:
Evidence from the FDA
By Hazel McMullin and Andrew B. Whitford*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Over the last five years, substantial attention has been paid to the arrangements
employed in the United States for the regulation and oversight of prescription drug use
and availability, much of it with regard to the New Drug Approval process at the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA).1 One central mechanism used by the FDA
for making regulatory decisions for medications and medical devices is collaborative or
team-based decision making. Advisory committees are charged with helping the FDA
make decisions; the use of such committees is supported by empirical and analytic
research on the power of groups to aggregate, assemble, and weigh complex information
for multi-faceted decisions.2 Of course, the use of decision-making teams is simple in
neither theory nor practice.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the use and value of extra-judicial decisionmaking (or deliberative) teams in the form of advisory committees for regulation by the
FDA. Our theoretical framework builds on common principles offered in organization
theory for the design of such coordination mechanisms, and is drawn from literature in
economics, decision theory, psychology, political science, and public management.
Specifically, we examine the performance in the context of the structure and functioning
of the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee (DSaRM) in the FDA.
Our examination centers on (1) the composition of such teams, and (2) the performance
of such teams with regard to standard criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of
deliberations.3
*

Hazel McMullin, B.A., from the Department of Public Administration and Policy at the School of Public
and International Affairs at The University of Georgia will receive her M.P.A. shortly. Andrew B.
Whitford, M.A., Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at
the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia, and is the corresponding author.
1
See, e.g., Daniel P. Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Approval: Processing, Politics and
Implications for Policy, 23 HEALTH AFF. 52 (2004); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government
Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996); Mary K. Olson, Managing Delegation in the
FDA: Reducing Delay in the New-Drug Review, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 397 (2004).
2
See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW
AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004); ANNA
GRANDORI, ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 2001); Matthew J. Gabel & Charles R.
Shipan, A Social Choice Approach to Expert Consensus Panels, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 543 (2004); Krishna
K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617
(1992).
3
GRANDORI, supra note 2, at 150.
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We first briefly review theoretical proposals about the value and performance of
such teams. After that, we discuss the DSaRM as a decision-making body in detail. We
then assess the DSaRM’s composition with regard to standard criteria for decisionmaking teams, and then turn to its performance with regard to the criteria we develop.
Finally, we offer a discussion of this body of theory, case, and evidence about decisionmaking bodies in medical decision making.
II. DECISION-MAKING TEAMS IN REGULATORY SETTINGS

¶4

¶5

The use of deliberative teams in regulatory settings encapsulates two threads of
theory developed over the past four decades. By “team” we mean “an ensemble of actors
with homogeneous preferences, differentiated knowledge and approximately equally
valuable resources, who decide and control collective actions in a joint mode.”4 In the
first thread of theory, which centers on team production, it is argued that just as public
goods cannot be consumed without cooperative action, that “team goods” require
cooperative action among producers.5 The central problem in the use of such teams for
production is shirking: each individual asked to contribute to the production of the good
has an incentive to decrease their effort level as other members increase their effort
levels. The solution that Alchian and Demsetz offer to the problem of obtaining joint
effort is to have a supervisor give instructions, observe the participants’ input behavior to
detect or estimate their marginal productivity, and apportion awards in line with that
observation. The past four decades of theoretical development on the design of such
teams has centered on finding the proper incentives for the manager (which in the private
sector might include an ownership stake in the team’s profits). Yet, we know generally
that even a manager who observes high quality output from the team as a whole cannot
necessarily trace and assign responsibility for that outcome;6 the manager then is forced
to allocate rewards in a fair way, which team members may not trust the manager to do.7
What can a fair manager do? One solution might be to reward team members on the
basis of personal information about each member or information received from the other
members.8 Even more complicated approaches have been offered, although how they are
used in practice is less than clear.9
In the second thread of theory, which centers on team aggregation, the question is
whether individuals acting in concert produce better estimates of hidden information than
individuals acting alone. Recent books like The Wisdom of Crowds, by James
Surowiecki, have popularized the insights of other, older theories on the ability of groups
4

Id. at 135.
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972).
6
Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 328 (1982).
7
GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS 224 (1992).
8
Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 80 (1979); Dilip Mookherjee,
Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 433, 435 (1984).
9
See, e.g., Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts, 91 J. POL.
ECON. 349, 354 (1983); Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor
Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981); James M. Malcomson, Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with
Many Agents, 53 REV. ECON. STUD. 807, 808 (1986); James M. Malcomson, Work Incentives, Hierarchy,
and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 486 (1984); Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes
and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14 BELL J. ECON. 21 (1983).
5
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to dampen cognitive biases and produce less-biased estimates of hidden information. For
Surowiecki, large numbers of evaluators with independent, diverse views will average
away individual-level biases that even experts can experience.10 These biases include:
availability bias, framing bias, overconfidence, and other risk-prone behavior.11 What
popular accounts of team information aggregation ignore, though, is the mechanism that
produces efficient estimation by groups. That mechanism is detailed in the Condorcet
Jury Theorem,12 which provides a logic for understanding why a group provides superior
estimates to individuals through better aggregation of information. Specifically, the Jury
Theorem is a result that majority rule is better than “dictatorship” (aggregation of only
one person’s information) when members of a group have similar preferences but
different information: that in a two-alternative “election” where people have the same
preferences but do not know which alternative best satisfies stated criteria, the group’s
view (based on private signals) performs better than any one member’s view.13 The past
decade has seen substantial investment in elaborating the Jury Theorem and the
conditions under which it holds. A number of papers show the generality of this result,14
and recently Condorcet’s intuition has been shown to be consistent with that of Nash
equilibrium.15 This is important because of its concordance with the theory of common
interest games – which forms a bridge to the economic theory of teams and team
production.16
The contrast between these two threads of research cannot be clearer. The
literature on team production emphasizes the “jointness” of production – the fact that
cooperative (or pooled) interdependence and intensive interdependence among
individuals17 allow groups to produce outputs greater than the sum of the individual
products (e.g., “generative” solutions). In contrast, much of the work on team
aggregation emphasizes the desirability (if not necessity) of independence of individual
views as a way of producing less-biased estimates. Scholars like Ladha have argued that
few problems arise when independence loses ground to correlated views among members
of the fact-finding team; indeed, a third thread of research on rational deliberation – on
the power of discussion among members of a group for negotiation and pragmatic
deliberation (for ethical discourse) – accounts for correlations among views (indeed,
proposes ways of increasing correlations) in order to arrive and achieve mutuallypreferred outcomes.18 This thread does have its criticisms, many of which relate to wellknown group pathologies of “groupthink” or differential risk propensities.
10

SUROWIECKI, supra note 2, at 23.
See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Possibilities: The State of the Art to 1980, in JUDGEMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 306, 331 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
12
Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, An Essay on the Application of Probability
Theory to Plurality Decision-Making, in CONDORCET: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL
THEORY 131 (Iain McLean & Fiona Hewitt eds. & trans., 1994) (1785).
13
Andrew McLennan, Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information
Aggregation by Rational Agents, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413 (1998).
14
See Ladha, supra note 2, at 620.
15
McLennan, supra note 13, at 413.
16
See Roy Radner, Teams, in DECISION AND ORGANIZATION: A VOLUME IN HONOR OF JACOB MARSCHEK
189, 193 (C. B. McGuire & Roy Radner eds., 1972).
17
JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 54 (1967).
18
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 250 (Ciaran
Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998).
11
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Generally, though, the following proposals are made with regard to the conditions
under which correct group dynamics are obtained.19 First, group members should be
involved in problem definition. Second, group members should be independent and free
to generate alternatives. Third, conflicts between group members should be around
issues and not against other individuals. Fourth, group members should have sufficient
common knowledge for dialogue. Fifth, there should be sufficient differentiation of
members’ roles within the group (e.g., a moderator).
¶8
How do these conditions fit with our understanding of decision-making teams as
means for joint production? In joint production, if team members cannot observe one
another and if supervisors cannot make inferences about the individual efforts from the
final output of the team, the problem of getting the individuals to “do the right thing” is
almost equivalent to the canonical incentives problem addressed by bilateral principalagency theory. It becomes difficult to do so because team members may shirk (“free
ride”) their obligations to help the team perform – or team members may form coalitions
(“cliques”) with implications for efficient operation.20 Managerially, it is very difficult to
write and implement a first-best contract that solves these problems. Indeed, numerous
studies have shifted the debate to emphasize how managers can strengthen a culture of
group work.21
¶9
Team production emphasizes a strong role for management in setting goals and
defining problems, interdependence of team members, and an almost inevitable conflict
among members about coordinated action. Team aggregation emphasizes the importance
for teams of defining problems as they go, the aggregation of many independent
individual valuations, and the construction of teams where conflicts between members
are over information and not values. To a degree, both threads of research emphasize
sufficient common knowledge and role differentiation (a moderator in the case of team
aggregation, and a monitor in the case of team production).
¶10
In practice, and especially in the governmental use of advisory committees, we may
observe different emphasis on these two approaches to teams. Are advisory committees
like the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee designed for
aggregating information or producing policy meant to improve drug regulation? Does the
DSaRM fulfill the conditions thought to support team production, or the conditions
thought to support team aggregation? Conditional on its design as a decision-making
team, does it perform effectively, efficiently, and fairly? The next section offers a broad
overview of the DSaRM and research on the use of advisory committees specifically at
the FDA for medical decision making. Following that, we turn to a structured analysis of
the committee as a decision-making (or deliberative) team.
19

See GRANDORI, supra note 2, at 135; RENSIS LIKERT, THE HUMAN ORGANIZATION: ITS MANAGEMENT
AND VALUE 155 (1967); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 112 (2d ed. 1970); Norman

R.
F. Maier, Assets and Liabilities in Group Problem Solving: The Need for an Integrative Function, 74
PSYCHOL. REV. 239 (1967).
20
See Bengt Holmström & Paul Milgrom, Regulating Trade Among Agents, 146 J. INST. THEORETICAL
ECON. 85 (1990); Hideshi Itoh, Collusion, Incentives, and Risk Sharing, 60 J. ECON. THEORY 410 (1993);
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 301,
318 (1990); Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 181, 207 (1986).
21
Holmström & Milgrom, supra note 20, at 85; Itoh, supra note 20, at 410; Inés Macho-Stadler & J. David
Pérez-Castrillo, Moral Hazard with Several Agents: The Gains from Cooperation, 11 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
73 (1993).

253

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2007

III. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE DSARM
¶11

Advisory committees are widely relied on for providing fair and impartial evidence
on the benefits and risks associated with medications and medical devices. The FDA
alone has thirty such advisory committees, with around eighty-five advisory committee
meetings a year; the members of such committees are considered “special government
employees.”22 We focus on the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee,
which was initially authorized on June 1, 2002, and resides inside the FDA’s Office of
Drug Safety (ODS) in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER).23 The ODS
was created in 2001 from the Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk Assessment with the
mission of adding “value to the review of risk management programs and the review of
drug safety issues.”
¶12
The purpose of the DSaRM is to advise the Commissioner of Food and Drugs “to
ensure safe and effective drugs for human use and, as required, any other product for
which the Food and Drug Administration has regulatory responsibility.”24 It meets four
times per year and consists of both standing and temporary appointed members, and of
voting and non-voting members (each member has one vote and all votes are of equal
weight). Meetings may be for the purpose of information gathering or formal
recommendation development; formal recommendations to the Commissioner are
reached by vote. Topics that have been considered vary from improving the usefulness
of consumer medical information for prescriptions, to the risk assessment program for
marketed drugs, and to oral tazarotene for the treatment of psoriasis.
¶13
While a number of studies discuss how such advisory committees can be used for
providing topical information for the regulation of medication and medical devices, no
studies address medical decision making by these groups in terms of the conditions for
team aggregation and production. Most studies are imminently practical, centering on the
policy implications of their proposals.25 Three analyses that examined the structures of
these advisory committees bear consideration, though. Steinbrook focuses on the role of
independence of members of the DSaRM – independence from the views of regulated
entities through provision of conflicts of interest waivers.26 Specifically, Steinbrook
notes that the construction of such groups is difficult if one desires full independence due
to the need for specialized information, but also suggested that full disclosure of potential
22

Robert Steinbrook, Financial Conflicts of Interest and the Food and Drug Administration’s Advisory
Committees, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 116, 118 (2005).
23
Talk Paper, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., New Advisory Subcommittee Created on Drug Safety and Risk
Management (Dec. 18, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2001/ANS01127.html. The
DSaRM was originally developed as a subcommittee to the Committee of Pharmaceutical Science.
24
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
COMMITTEE CHARTER – DRUG SAFETY & RISK MANAGEMENT DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1 (2006),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/audiences/acspage/DSaRMcharter.htm (last visited March 15, 2007) [hereinafter
COMMITTEE CHARTER].
25
Bruce Goldfarb, FDA Panel Recommends COX-2 Drugs Remain on Market, 2 DOC NEWS 1 (2005),
available at http://docnews.diabetesjournals.org/cgi/content/full/2/4/1; Eleanor M. Perfetto et al., EvidenceBased Risk Management: How Can We Succeed?: Deliberations from a Risk Management Advisory
Council, 37 DRUG INFO. J. 127 (2003); Kate Traynor, FDA’s Adverse-Event Surveillance Needs
Improvement, Advisers Say, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 1336 (2005); Cori Vanchieri, Researchers
Plan to Continue to Study COX-2 Inhibitors in Cancer Treatment and Prevention, 97 J. NAT’L CANCER
INST. 552, 553 (2005).
26
Steinbrook, supra note 22, at 118.

254

Vol. 5:2]

Hazel McMullin and Andrew B. Whitford

conflicts of interest so that any differences among members expressed in deliberation
were known to be related potentially to differences in values and not just differences in
held information. Similarly, Thompson points out both positives (such as the
Committee’s use of a facilitator in the form of an executive secretary for efficiency) and
negatives (such as the prohibition against members conversing in an organized manner
using e-mail for open meetings purposes) that limit and expand the team’s ability to
aggregate and process information in a timely manner.27 The DSaRM is not the only
example of broader thinking about FDA advisory committees and the conditions under
which they are effective, efficient, and fair. For example, Shapiro investigates the FDA’s
Public Board of Inquiry as a deliberative setting for the adjudication of claims over
scientific disputes.28 The selection of board members, their geographic location, the
procedures used by members to deliberate – all of these represent core decision points in
the design and operation of that committee as a means for assembling and acting upon
technical information with a goal of producing objectively better results. Of course, the
issue of effective operation of federal advisory committees is a long-standing concern for
those with broad public policy (and especially, scientific) interests. Staffing can be a
political choice (an exercise in “deck stacking”),29 and such concerns seem to be elevated
under the current Administration.30
¶14
The purpose of this paper is to critically assess the construction and operation of
the DSaRM with regard to standard conditions for the design of teams for information
aggregation and/or team production. The few existing studies on these kinds of advisory
committees indicate how those design elements bind the hands of team members trying to
develop views on policy information and perhaps even make policy decisions. While
most studies center on those policy views and decisions, the underlying causes of the
views and decisions are neglected – and knowledge of those causes, of the conditions for
group performance, is a core step toward a better understanding of group decision making
on medications and medical devices in the federal government.
¶15
We center our analysis in this paper on the fourteen core committee members
consisting of thirteen voting members and one non-voting member over the course of two
meetings. We focus on the standing committee members because they constitute a stable
research base and represent the primary members necessary for and involved in an
aggregation or production decisions. Recently, the Committee has received substantial
attention because of its role in high-profile regulatory decisions of the FDA. As one
example, in February 2005, the Committee convened jointly with the Arthritis Advisory
Committee over the safety of cyclooxygenase-2 (Cox-2) inhibitors. The use of transcript
information from two meetings was chosen to attempt to evaluate the ability of the group
to meet its stated purpose (effectiveness) in an efficient and fair manner. Our first
selected meeting was held May 5, 2004, and was solely for information gathering
purposes; it was chosen to focus research on the internal group communication efforts.31
27

Cheryl A. Thompson, Safety Advisory Group Gets Mixed Marks from Members, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS.
PHARM. 236, 239 (2005).
28
Sidney A. Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating the FDA’s
Public Board of Inquiry, 2 DUKE L.J. 288, 290 (1986).
29
See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 6 (1990).
30
D. Ferber, Critics See a Tilt in a CDC Science Panel, 297 SCI. 1456 (2002); Robert Steinbrook, Science,
Politics, and Federal Advisory Committees, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1454 (2004).
31
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DRUG
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The second meeting used was held February 16-18, 2005, as a joint meeting with the
Arthritis Advisory Council for the purpose of providing recommendations to the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs;32 this is the Cox-2 meeting. We chose this meeting to
provide insight research opportunities about the interactions of the group within a larger
setting, as well as for evaluating decision making as it relates to the authorized method of
voting by the group. In the next section, we turn to an analysis of the DSaRM as a
committee and the application of core concepts of team decision making.
IV. TEAM COMPONENTS AND EVALUATION
¶16

We start by arguing that the DSaRM can be considered a team (in the theoretical
sense) because it is “an ensemble of actors with homogeneous preferences, differentiated
knowledge and approximately equally valuable resources (peers), who decide and control
collective actions in a joint mode.”33 The DSaRM is a selected group of individuals who
are appointed by a stated authority (specifically, the FDA Commissioner). The
committee is charged with being “knowledgeable in risk communication, risk
management, drug safety, medical, behavioral, and biological sciences as they apply to
risk management and drug abuse.”34 Membership is chosen selectively, with one voting
member representing consumers and one non-voting member representing the drug
industry.35 Based on this stated guidance, we infer that members selected are meant to
have similar interests toward the goal of evaluating drug safety and risk. We do not infer
or attempt to determine whether any members have “hidden agendas” at variance with
the stated purpose of the committee. Based on curriculum vitae information36 and the
committee roster,37 the DSaRM members appear homogeneous in their career choices in
that all have stated expertise relating to the medical field: four in pharmacology in
various forms, two in psychology, three in biometrics or risk analysis, two in medical

SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (DSARM) COMMITTEE MEETING 12 (2004),
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/04/transcripts/2004-4040T1.pdf [hereinafter COMMITTEE MEETING].
32
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 1 JOINT
MEETING OF THE ARTHRITIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND THE DRUG SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 23 (2005), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/transcripts/2005-4090T1.pdf
[hereinafter 1 JOINT MEETING]; CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, 2 JOINT MEETING OF THE ARTHRITIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND THE DRUG SAFETY
AND RISK MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 90 (2005),
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/transcripts/2005-4090T2.pdf [hereinafter 2 JOINT MEETING];
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 3 JOINT
MEETING OF THE ARTHRITIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND THE DRUG SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 8 (2005), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/transcripts/2005-4090T3.pdf
[hereinafter 3 JOINT MEETING].
33
GRANDORI, supra note 2, at 135.
34
COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 24, at 1. The DSaRM operates under the provisions of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. §
2 (2001)).
35
COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 24.
36
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DRUG
SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE ROSTER (2007),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/audiences/acspage/dsarmroster.htm (last visited March 15, 2007) [hereinafter
COMMITTEE ROSTER]; Channing Laboratory - Richard Platt, http://www.channing.harvard.edu/platt.htm
(last visited April 22, 2007).
37
COMMITTEE ROSTER, supra note 36.
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specialties, one in ethics, and one in public health policy.38 We argue that all career
choices demonstrate reasonable applicability to issues that might be encountered when
evaluating and making recommendations concerning drug effectiveness and risk. Our
starting point is an inference that the committee members have homogeneous preferences
and meet the first defined criterion to be considered as a team.
¶17
The stated structure of the group requires that committee members bring certain
types of differentiated knowledge to the group. The expertise fields represented by the
group certainly meet both the stated committee structure and provide a variety of
applicable but differentiated knowledge backgrounds. The group also displays this
differentiation across their current employers: seven members work in academia, three
for trade/professional organizations/boards, two are in private business, and one works
for a private hospital.39 This distribution is more heavily weighted in the academic arena,
but there still exists a differentiated perspective based on employment choices, thus
meeting the second part of the definition.
¶18
We evaluated the peer status by compiling information from the curricula vitae and
roster information of the members to determine if their education levels and professional
status were similar enough in stature that the members would reasonably recognize each
other as peers.40 Of the fourteen members four are M.D.’s, six hold Ph.D.’s, five hold
M.A. or M.S. degrees, four have doctoral level degrees of types other than Ph.D., one
holds a J.D., and two have other professional credentials. While some members have
more than one of the above credentials, all members have advanced educational
credentials.41 A second evaluation of the professional stature through the use of current
job titles shows that one is department chair, three are professors, three are associate
professors, two hold the title of President, two of Vice President/CEO and one of
Coordinator. Most of these job titles had additional information further defining the job
function (such as field of specialty), but we focused on perceived/actual hierarchy
typically associated with the main title function.42 From general perceptions of title and
stature all but the “Coordinator” title indicate a high level of status within their
appropriate organizations. In further review of the curriculum vitae of the member with
the “Coordinator” title, we found this person to have come through a retail pharmacy
background into a hospital setting.43 We expect that the title “Coordinator” has a higher
level of status inside this environment, which may be comparable to the easily perceived
high-level titles of the other members.44 The committee members appear to be
professional peers as well.
¶19
The structure of the group states that members are either “voting” or “non-voting.”
Therefore any recommendations made by the committee to the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs have been arrived at through a vote count. Voting, in its nature, meets the
joint mode criteria. After reviewing the transcripts, we infer that the committee functions
38

Id.
Id.; Channing Laboratory - Richard Platt, supra note 36.
40
COMMITTEE ROSTER, supra note 36.
41
Id.
42
For example, the range of additional information included “Patient Care Coordinator,” “Professor of
Epidemiology,” and “Professor of Bioethics.” Id.
43
Id.
44
We admit that this cannot be verified because the title of “Coordinator” varies in meaning across
organizations.
39
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in a collective and joint decision-making process even prior to the vote on final
recommendations.45 The meetings are structured around presentations, which allow for
questions, answers and debate as well as formal question and answer periods.
Additionally, in the February 2005 three-day meeting where formal recommendations
were made, any member was given a final opportunity to ask questions, to comment or to
seek clarification immediately prior to the vote count. The committee chair
accomplished this by asking every committee member individually if the member had
any follow-up questions or comments or needed additional information before the vote
was taken.46 While there appeared to be no effort to force opinions on one another or
influence vote selections, there was significant effort jointly made by all committee
members to ensure that the information was sufficiently covered and presented for the
benefit of the formal group process of voting. This meets the last stated team criterion
that they “decide and control collective actions in a joint mode.”47
V. TEAM FUNCTIONALITY ANALYSIS
¶20

We next evaluate the DSaRM Advisory Committee team’s ability to function in an
effective, efficient, and fair manner. Our evaluation is based on four days of meeting
transcripts over two meetings.48 The first meeting was a one-day meeting held May 5,
2004 of the DSaRM Advisory Committee for the purpose of sharing information about
inhalation drug packaging. Ten members of the DSaRM committee were present: nine
voting, one non-voting. No votes were required or taken at this meeting. The second
meeting was a three-day joint meeting of the DSaRM Advisory Committee and the
Arthritis Advisory Committee held for the purpose of ultimately making
recommendations to the Commissioner of Food and Drug to use in the determination of
whether or not to return VIOXX® and other Cox-2 inhibitor drugs to the market. We
reviewed transcripts to determine the type and level of group interactions.
A. Team Effectiveness

¶21

We define the effectiveness of the group as the ability to meet the purpose of the
group, which is stated as “advises the Commissioner or designee in discharging
responsibilities as they relate to helping to ensure safe and effective drugs for human use
and, as required, any other product for which the Food and Drug Administration has
regulatory responsibility.”49 The transcripts indicate that the committee received clear
and abundant information for its use. The information included safety data, clinical trial
45

COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 31, at 12; 1 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 23; 2 JOINT MEETING,
supra note 32, at 142; 3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 10.
46
3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 201.
47
There were two days of full discussion before a single vote was taken. On the third day, when the first
vote came, Dr. Wood called for the first vote, saying:
Any other discussion? Great. Let's go, now – now, I have got strict instructions as to how to do this.
So we have to go around the room and everybody has to say their name and then vote yes or no. So
you precede your vote with your name. And we are dealing with Question 1.a.
Id. at 184.
48
COMMITTEE MEETING, supra note 31, at 1; 1 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 1; 2 JOINT MEETING,
supra note 32, at 1; 3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 1.
49
COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 24.
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information, specific product information, and risk/benefit assessment information as
well as other data. Industry representatives, FDA staff, researchers, and clinicians made
most of the presentations. The committee members’ willingness to verbally engage in
information seeking and sharing, given their knowledge and backgrounds, imply that they
had many opportunities to formulate recommendations. While they made no
recommendations during the first meeting,50 they voted on at least seven easily
identifiable recommendations during the second meeting.51 In the case study of the
transcripts of this meeting, the Committee met its effectiveness criteria in that it provided
formally stated advice for the Commissioner’s use.
B. Team Efficiency
¶22

We evaluated committee efficiency based on the structure of the meetings and, in
the case of the second meeting, the ability to achieve recommendations based on vote
count by the end of the scheduled meeting time. The transcripts for the two meetings
showed that meetings began at or near the stated meeting times and that the published
agendas were followed. Information was presented in an organized manner, questions
and answers were allowed, and the committee Chair made sufficient efforts to keep each
meeting moving in a productive, timely manner. By the end of the meetings Committee
members seemed comfortable that information had been adequately presented and that
their questions had been asked and answered inside the stated time frames for the
meetings. Both meetings met their stated agenda goals within the original time
constraints, indicating to us that the group design did function efficiently. But what about
external efficiency? We were unable to analyze whether issues were presented to the
group in a timely and efficient manner or whether the recommendations made by the
group were used in a timely and efficient manner. We restrict our research to the
efficient use of time during the stated meeting parameters because this is what the group
can control. We will return to this issue of external and internal control below.
C. Team Fairness

¶23

To evaluate the criterion of fairness, we use a standard definition of “fair” as “just
to all parties.”52 Does this group function in a manner that is “fair” to each individual in
that it allows each individual the opportunity to participate? Is this individual
participation fair in that members of the group do not unduly influence the participation
level of others? Is the participation fair by being reasonably free of the opinion
influences of acquiescence and groupthink? Is the process by which final decisions are
reached fair? The meeting transcripts from the two meetings cited above were analyzed
in an effort to answer these questions and draw a conclusion about the fairness
component of a group.
¶24
We analyzed four days of transcripts over two meetings to determine if individuals
had fair and ample opportunities to participate by counting the number of times each
committee member spoke. Our count included introductions and vote counts as well as
50
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3 JOINT MEETING, supra note 32, at 337.
52
WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 461 (Anne H. Soukhanov & Kaethe Ellis eds.,
1984).
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questions, answers, and commentary, and was done by a name search through each
transcript document so that each participant was noted as participating each time the
transcriber recorded their name as the speaking individual. During the May 5, 2004,
meeting of the DSaRM, nine of the fourteen members were present: eight voting
members and one non-voting member.53 This was an information-gathering meeting
consisting of presentations and question and answer sessions with nothing to be voted on.
Members were in turn asked to introduce themselves. They were on a first-name basis
with each other as noted throughout all four days of transcript material reviewed, so we
believe the introductions were for the purpose of getting the participants formally into the
recorded document and to inform the public, presenters, and others about the identity of
the committee members in attendance. The meeting followed the published agenda and
after formalities to open the meeting, consisted of topical presentations followed by a
question-and-answer period. While there were some questions asked during the
presentations, questions were generally reserved for the question-and-answer periods.
During this meeting, committee members individually spoke between 6 and 156 times.
All committee members spoke during the meeting. The committee chairman spoke the
most, and much of his commentary was procedural, though determining the distribution
of commentary between procedural and professional is quite difficult because much of
this was entwined. Because the Chairman spoke 129 times more than the next closest
committee member, and 939% more than the group average of 16.6 times, we removed
his tally from further analysis. After the chairman’s tally was removed the members
spoke between six and twenty seven times each. The member who spoke the least was
the non-voting, industry representative. There are a number of reasons why this may
have occurred, and we do not have enough information to speculate as to why she spoke
the least; however, her tally of six was reasonably close to the next voting committee
member who spoke ten times and much closer to the individual group numbers than the
chairman, so we did not exclude her numbers from the analysis. The total number of
times committee members spoke was 133 during approximately six and a half hours of
meeting time. On average each member spoke 16.6 times for an average of 2.5 times per
hour over the course of the meeting day.
¶25
We also analyzed the joint meeting of the DSaRM and the Arthritis Advisory
Committee that was held from February 16-18, 2005.54 This meeting was used to
determine whether DSaRM members continued to participate in a larger, combined group
setting where votes were taken for the approval and where recommendations were made
to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. There were eleven DSaRM members present
for all three days including the non-voting member. The tallies for these days also
included introductions and voting round participation. Over the three-day period DSaRM
committee members spoke 268 times. All members spoke between eight and fifty-one
times. While the industry leader spoke considerably less than even the next closest
member (who spoke eighteen times), the removal of her participation number from the
total did not significantly impact the overall number analysis. During this three-day
meeting DSaRM committee members each spoke on average 8.1 times per day for an
average of 1.25 times per hour.
53
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¶26

In summary, we claim that the DSaRM committee members had a fair opportunity
to participate, since all present participated in each meeting and the average participations
per hour indicated ample participation. While the average number per hour in the second
meeting was half of that of the first meeting, we attribute the reduction to the fact that
there were only 23 total participants listed on the formal meeting transcript for the 2004
meeting while there were an average of 53.6 participants per day listed for the three day
meeting in 2005.55 Clearly, if everyone participated fairly there would be an approximate
reduction by one-half when the group size almost doubled from the first meeting to the
second. We did not analyze DSaRM participation levels compared to those of the
Arthritis Advisory Committee.
¶27
We also concluded, based on the above analysis and a review of meeting structure
and procedure, that individual members were not hindering others’ participation. All
members participated in both meetings, the number of spoken acknowledgements
remained similar given meeting size over the course of the two meetings, and
procedurally, prior to voting during the second meeting, the meeting chair specifically
and individually called upon each member to question or comment one last time before a
vote count was taken. The meeting participants were courteous throughout the meeting,
even during disagreement, and we perceived that no grandstanding, pontificating,
avoidance, or acquiescence was taking place. The transcript indicated that all DSaRM
members were able and willing to participate and exchange information freely.
¶28
The last component we looked at to determine fairness was the voting process and
its results. The voting process in and of itself is generally recognized as procedurally
fair, particularly when it is conducted using the method of one vote per participant with
no weighting of votes. Based on the prior analysis and the source information (official
transcripts), we did not take into account any possibility of vote manipulation (vote
buying or swapping), which could occur. We assumed that all votes were uninfluenced
by unethical occurrences outside of the meetings themselves. We analyzed seven easily
identifiable recommendation voting rounds taken on day three of the February 2005
meeting56 in an effort to determine if votes appeared to be cast based on the true
preference of each individual and that groupthink was not likely occurring. Over the
seven voting rounds analyzed only the votes during rounds one, three, and five had
unanimous vote counts of ten “yes” and zero “no” votes. The remaining four voting
rounds were diverse in their vote splits as follows:
Round 2

9 yes

1 no

Round 4

2 yes

6 no

Round 6

5 yes

5 no

Round 7

2 yes

7 no

1 abstain 1 pass

1 abstain

55
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¶29

Since the DSaRM members were part of a larger voting group, there was no need
to address the split vote count in Round 6, as the total vote outcome was not evenly split.
Based on the above, more than half the time, the DSaRM members displayed
disagreement about their voting preferences, indicating their seeming freeness to vote as
individuals based on their own evaluations and conclusions. The transcripts showed no
effort on the part of the meeting chair to re-vote to a closer vote count, nor did we find
any discussion about the vote count or the results once the vote was taken. There were
some references to the readiness of the entire group to move to the vote, and some
attempts to start the voting round were thwarted because a member was not finished with
the information gathering process. A useful step was taken by the committee chair, who
appeared to promote fairness and to reduce potential bias when he rotated the starting
member for the vote count to a different voting member at the beginning of each round.
We could not tell from the transcripts whether the direction of vote taking changed as
well (left to right, right to left, etc.). However, the fact that the vote starting point
changed for each round indicated to us that additional effort was being made to address
the appearance of procedural fairness and the reduction of potential bias as well.
¶30
In summary, the DSaRM seems to meet the fairness criteria. Participants clearly
exchanged information freely within the context of a formal meeting setting. The
atmosphere of the meetings was courteous. Committee members were on a first-name
basis. They were able to state disagreement with presenters and each other and all
occurrences of this in the parts of the transcripts reviewed showed the disagreements to
be specifically technical. We inferred no incidents of personal attacks. The level of
participation by individuals seemed reasonable and the voting mechanism and procedure
was appropriate to ensure individual preferences were expressed.
VI. DISCUSSION
¶31

Recall our five conditions, drawn from a diverse basis in organization theory and
economics, which, when met, contribute to the group “maintaining correct dynamics,”
presumably leading to a group’s effectiveness and success. These conditions are that the
group is involved in problem definition, is free to independently generate alternatives, has
conflicts focused on the problem and on other members of the team, has sufficient role
differentiation, and allows for the presence of common knowledge. We found that the
group clearly met the second, third and fifth conditions, as illustrated in our analysis
above. The group clearly is able to communicate openly in a courteous, respectful and
friendly environment as reflected in the transcripts. The only conflicts we read in the
transcripts solely focused on the technical information presented. We found no personal
references about any individuals other than those needed to address or identify members.
The DSaRM group had the background knowledge (measured in terms of a common
language, competences, and values) such that they were able to understand one another
and engage in joint deliberation of ideas.57 With regard to the first condition, that they
participate in problem identification, we found no evidence in transcript or research
review to suggest that the committee participates in what issues are brought before them.
We discerned formal or informal role assignments only in the case of the Chair and the
57
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Executive Secretary. Generally, we claim that the DSaRM meets more of these
principles about effective group dynamics than not – potentially increasing the overall
quality and/or timeliness of the product delivered in the form of recommendations.
Overall, the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee meets the
definition of a team and it functions under the conditions which should make the group
effective, efficient, and fair. In short, the committee members are “an ensemble of actors
with homogenous preferences” in that they have similar educational and field of endeavor
backgrounds as well as an assumed commitment to the safety of drugs as used by the
general population.58 They bring differentiated knowledge as evidenced by the
committee structure requirements and their own individual chosen areas of expertise.
They would be considered peers by their comparable formal education levels and their
employment status and job titles. They clearly decide and control collective actions of
the group together through the voting process.
They have also met conditions that make the team effective, efficient, and fair.
They are effective in that they deliver recommendations to the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs and therefore meet their designated and stated purpose. They function
efficiently in that they monitor their own activities through the formal meeting structure
to ensure that deliverables are produced in the stated time frame for decision making,
within the context of the published meeting dates and times. Their communications and
decision-making mechanism is fair in that it allows free exchange of information among
peers without overt (at least) biases and pressures coming into play.
The theory behind this group, its structure, its communication ability and its
outcomes seems sound and the DSaRM Advisory Committee is virtually the same as
those artificial committees constructed in theory for the aggregation of information and
the production of policy.
Our analysis focused on the microcosm of the group, its internal ability to function,
and its ability to meet the charter stated purpose. The FDA has eighteen drug-related
advisory committees who prepare information for the use of the Commissioner. Fifteen
of these committees specialize in specific types of drugs, two specialize in the
pharmacological issues of drugs in general, and the DSaRM focuses on the generalized
safety of all drugs to the general population. While we did not obtain in-depth
knowledge of the other committees, we recognize that the DSaRM is one of three
committees with overlapping responsibility with any or all of the other committees (the
other two possibly being those in pharmacology). We reviewed evidence in the second
set of transcripts that shows that the DSaRM functioned jointly with the Arthritis Drug
Advisory Committee. We presume that the FDA could ask the DSaRM to consider drugs
from any of the fifteen drug-specific committees even though the DSaRM only meet four
times a year; the structure and assignments for this committee could significantly delay
information review and recommendations based on time availability and the volume of
requests from the other committees. In the larger environment, this situation is probably
not as functional and efficient as it seems in the microcosm.
If we take a step further and examine the macro-environment of the general public,
we are suspect of placing this organizational team inside the FDA structure. The FDEA
uses the results of DSaRM’s deliberations to justify removals of drugs from the market,
58
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returns of drugs to the market, and packaging/labeling issues. Most recently, after the
above-reviewed meetings of February 16-18, 2005, the DSaRM committee recommended
to the Commissioner that VIOXX® and other Cox-2 inhibiting drugs were safe for use,
with some packaging and literature insert adjustments, and that they should be returned to
the market.59 This finding created quite a vocal outcry that was well-covered in the news.
Some common complaints were that the FDA does not have the best safety interest of the
public at its forefront and that a committee that is under FDA jurisdiction is only selfserving and does not provide independent overview of drug safety issues.60 Prior to the
VIOXX® return-to-market recommendations, the FDA was already under criticism for
its self-monitoring structure. Senator Grassley (R-Iowa) stated that he was preparing
legislation that would separate the Office of Drug Safety (and assumedly its committees
and subcommittees) from the office that approves drugs for market in an effort to have at
least one drug approval committee not under FDA jurisdiction.61 We claim that even if
the DSaRM does internally function as an effective group, in the environment of the
general public and its legislators there is a problem at least with its perceived ability to
produce unbiased recommendations.
¶37
We conclude that a team can be an effectively functioning group within its own
parameters but not necessarily provide the efficacy to the larger organization within
which it is established. The larger organization, here being the FDA, should make a more
concerted effort to consider external stakeholders and how such a team may or may not
be perceived and utilized by all stakeholders. Given the above situation, the FDA
announced in February (prior to the VIOXX® recommendations) that it would create yet
another advisory team, to be named the Drug Safety Oversight Board.62 This Board will
also report through the FDA perhaps setting up yet another situation for internal team
validity, external inefficiency, and suspect scrutiny.
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